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In this paper I seek to assess the responses provided by several theories 
of suffi cientarian justice in cases where individuals hold different con-
ceptions of rationality. Towards this purpose, I build two test cases and 
study the normative prescriptions which various suffi ciency views offer 
in each of them. I maintain that resource suffi cientarianism does not 
provide a normatively plausible response to the fi rst case, since its dis-
tributive prescriptions would violate the principle of personal good and 
that subjective-threshold welfare suffi cientarianism as well as objective-
threshold welfare suffi cientarianism committed to the headcount claim 
do not provide normatively plausible responses to the second case, since 
their distributive prescriptions would violate the principle of equal im-
portance. I then claim that an objective-threshold welfare suffi cientarian 
view committed to prioritarianism under the threshold offers the norma-
tively plausible response to both cases and therefore resists the challenge 
raised by scenarios that involve differential conceptions of rationality.
Keywords: Maximization, resources, satisfi cing, suffi cientarianism, 
welfare.
1. Introduction
Suffi cientarianism holds that distributive justice should primarily be 
concerned with providing individuals enough of some preferred concep-
tion of the proper currency of justice. This core idea embodies two cen-
tral claims, termed by Paula Casal the positive thesis and the negative 
thesis, respectively. According to Casal, “the positive thesis stresses the 
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importance of people living above a certain threshold, free from depri-
vation. The negative thesis denies the relevance of certain additional 
distributive requirements” (Casal 2007: 297–298).1 The view has origi-
nally been developed by Frankfurt (1987) as a reaction to the pervasive 
egalitarian strand of thought characterizing contemporary analytical 
political philosophy and, independently, by Crisp (2003) as an alter-
native to both telic egalitarianism and prioritarianism. It has subse-
quently been extended by a number of authors (Orr 2005, Benbaji 2005, 
2006, Casal 2007, Huseby 2010, Shields 2012, Axelsen and Nielsen 
2015, 2016), who vary different components of the original theories 
and provide their own versions of the suffi ciency view. In this article, I 
seek to explore the plausibility of a number of suffi cientarian theories 
in light of their responses to cases in which individuals act on the basis 
of different conceptions of rationality.2 There are a number of reasons 
why examining normative theories in light of such cases is important. 
First, case-based desirability critiques form a central part of the meth-
odology of analytical political and moral philosophy, as they provide 
tools with which philosophers can submit theories to “normative tests” 
(McDermott 2008: 19). Thus, if the cases constructed are useful in il-
luminating the moral commitments of theories, and in particular, their 
counterintuitive and morally problematic consequences, they should be 
taken seriously by philosophers, regardless of their practical likelihood 
of occurrence. Second, taking such cases into account is useful in il-
luminating some of the ontological commitments of normative theories 
as well. In the particular context of suffi cientarianism discussed here, 
the cases will show that some suffi ciency views provide adequate re-
sponses only when all individuals are satisfi cers, while others provide 
adequate responses only when all individuals are maximizers. Third, a 
wide range of empirical evidence shows that individuals are not actu-
ally identical maximizing machines as the homo economicus model of 
neoclassical economics assumes for methodological purposes, but that 
they are distinctly rational (or, even irrational) on various dimensions. 
The differential nature of human reasoning should therefore be taken 
into account when we design normative theories in general, and theo-
ries concerning distributive justice in particular.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 I describe the con-
stitutive elements of a suffi cientarian theory of justice and show how 
they can be varied in order to obtain a number of different suffi ciency 
views. In section 3 I describe the two conceptions of rationality used in 
1 Some suffi cientarians replace the latter with a weaker, shift thesis, which only 
states that “once people have secured enough there is a discontinuity in the rate of 
change of the marginal weight of our reasons to benefi t them further” (Shields 2012: 
108).
2 In particular, I am only concerned here with what Satz and Ferejohn call a 
“formal and thin conception of rationality” (Satz and Ferejohn 1994: 72), taking 
into account only the mathematical properties of individual preferences, not their 
content.
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constructing the cases with which the paper is concerned. In section 4 I 
describe the fi rst case, Resource plenitude, and argue that the response 
which resource suffi cientarianism offers to such cases is morally ob-
jectionable. In section 5 I describe the second case, Resource scarcity, 
and argue that the responses which subjective-threshold welfare suffi -
cientarianism and objective-threshold welfare suffi cientarianism com-
mitted to the headcount claim offer to such cases are also morally ob-
jectionable. I then argue, in section 6, that objective-threshold welfare 
suffi cientarianism committed to prioritarianism under the threshold 
offers the morally plausible response in both cases and is impervious to 
the challenge raised in this paper by weakening the standard assump-
tion of maximizing rationality. Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical background: Suffi cientarianism
Since suffi cientarianism is a view of distributive justice, one of the key 
issues which it needs to address in order to be considered a complete 
normative theory is to specify a currency of justice, or otherwise stated, 
to answer the equality of what question. In this respect, classical suf-
fi cientarian theories (Frankfurt 1987,3 Crisp 2003) as well as many re-
cent developments (Benbaji 2005, Huseby 2010) standardly take wel-
fare4 as the currency of justice, while others endorse either resources 
(Orr 2005) or some conception of capabilities5 (Anderson 1999, Axelsen 
and Nielsen 2015, 2016).
While the currency issue concerns all theories of distributive jus-
3 Frankfurt’s preferred currency is actually somewhat more diffi cult to ascertain, 
since his discussions on distributions are generally conducted only in terms of money. 
This has led Temkin (2003: 765) to suggest that Frankfurt is actually attacking a 
straw man, since egalitarians would agree that it is not simply the inequality of 
economic resources which we should aim to mitigate. But there are good grounds 
to claim that he does in fact employ welfare as currency, a position which we may 
infer from his operationalization of the threshold notion (see below), with economic 
resources exclusively playing the role of distribuendum of justice (see Gheaus 2016 
for the distinction between distribuenda and currencies of justice). The idea that 
Frankfurt proposes a welfarist version of suffi cientarianism is also suggested by 
Goodin (1987: 45–46), Nathanson (2005: 371) and Huseby (2010: 181).
4 Following Arneson (2000), throughout this article I use the terms utility, 
welfare and well-being interchangeably. While the three concepts may not be, strictly 
speaking, identical under some interpretations, this terminological simplifi cation 
is required in order to preserve a common language for the family of distributive 
justice theories with which I am concerned here, since various suffi cientarians use 
all of them to denote the same idea (for instance Frankfurt (1987) uses the term 
utility, Crisp (2003) uses utility and welfare interchangeably, Huseby (2010) uses 
welfare and well-being interchangeably and Benbaji (2005) uses all three of them 
interchangeably).
5 In this paper I will only be concerned with theories instantiating either welfare 
or resources as a currency, since the informational framework of the cases in 
which I am interested in is too parsimonious to adequately capture the demands of 
capability suffi cientarianism. See, however, Arneson (2006) for a powerful criticism 
of this view.
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tice, a complete suffi ciency view needs to further address four other 
questions as well: (1) what the suffi ciency threshold is, (2) how the cur-
rency is to be distributed below the threshold of suffi ciency, (3) how the 
currency is to be distributed above the threshold of suffi ciency and (4) 
how strict should the priority relation generated by the threshold be. 
Various suffi cientarian theories offer different responses to the fi rst 
question. Harry Frankfurt sets the suffi ciency threshold at the level of 
contentment, understood in the sense that while an individual’s mar-
ginal utility for gaining economic benefi ts above the threshold is not 
nullifi ed, she does not have an active interest in obtaining more eco-
nomic resources. In his own phrasing, “the fact that he is content is 
quite consistent with his recognizing that his economic circumstances 
could be improved and that his life might as a consequence become 
better than it is. But this possibility is not important to him” (Frank-
furt 1987: 39). Roger Crisp offers a different answer. To illustrate the 
idea of a suffi ciency threshold, he uses two elements: (1) the notion of 
impartial spectator and (2) the notion of compassion. According to him, 
“the spectator puts himself or herself into the shoes of all those affected 
and is concerned more to the extent that the individual in question is 
badly off. A spectator who shows no special concern for the badly off 
has a vice—he or she is uncompassionate” (Crisp 2003: 757). What re-
sults from the conjunction of the notion of an impartial spectator with 
that of compassion is the suffi ciency threshold, one which is in his own 
terms “principled and nonarbitrary” (Crisp 2003: 757), and which is set 
at the highest level of welfare at which this impartial spectator still 
feels compassion for the individual in question. Since it is the specta-
tor who evaluates the level of welfare, not each particular individual, 
the implication of the theory is that the level where compassion disap-
pears is the same for all individuals. Other suffi cientarians, such as 
Huseby (2010) or Benbaji (2005) use multi-level thresholds instead of 
single-level thresholds, as was the case with those proposed by Frank-
furt (1987) and Crisp (2003). Huseby distinguishes between two dif-
ferent suffi cientarian threshold levels, a minimal one and a maximal 
one, with the former being located at the level where basic means to 
subsistence, or the basic needs of the individual, are satisfi ed, and the 
latter being located at the level where the individual can be said to 
be content, understood here as “satisfaction with the overall quality 
of one’s life” (Huseby 2010: 181). In contrast with the two-tiered suffi -
ciency view proposed by Huseby, Benbaji’s view recognizes three levels 
of suffi ciency as morally salient: a personhood level, a pain level and a 
luxury level. The fi rst of these is located just above the level where the 
life of the respective person is not worth living anymore,6 the second 
one just above the level where individuals have negative welfare values 
6 Benbaji avoids the implication that non-human beings would therefore have 
lives not worth living, by specifying the additional condition that only the life of 
a being which falls below the threshold, after previously being above it would be 
subjected to the application of this principle (Benbaji 2006: 339).
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and the third one is placed at the level where individuals “are so well 
off at that time that every small benefi t to them would be a luxury” 
(Benbaji 2006: 339–342).
The four suffi ciency views described in the previous paragraph 
give rise to a general and fundamental distinction in the operational-
ization of welfare suffi cientarian thresholds, namely between subjec-
tive thresholds and objective thresholds. Theories that use subjective 
thresholds maintain that the level of welfare at which the threshold is 
placed is established by each individual through the means of particu-
lar perceptions of her own welfare level. In general, to operationalize 
this threshold, we assume that there is a point in the welfare functions 
of individuals where they will say that they are, in some specifi c sense, 
satisfi ed with their current welfare level. Frankfurt’s (1987) theory as 
well as Huseby’s view share this feature. In Frankfurt’s theory, this 
point is represented by the level after which individuals would not have 
an active interest in pursuing the accumulation of further resources 
as means for welfare enhancements. In Huseby’s proposal, this point 
would be represented by the level at which the individual would consid-
er that he is content with his level of utility. By contrast, theories that 
use objective thresholds maintain that the welfare level at which the 
threshold is placed is set by an external source, without any input from 
the agent subjected to the distributive scheme. Crisp’s account of the 
suffi ciency threshold is paradigmatic for this view, since he builds his 
notion of a threshold in relation to an impartial spectator, who evalu-
ates the distribution and establishes the threshold at the utility level 
where compassion on the part of the impartial spectator would enter. 
While Benbaji’s account is not so explicit in this regard, the personhood 
and pain thresholds seem to be non-controversially objective, since de-
cision-making capacities are not subjected to individual perception and 
a negative level of welfare is described in neutral terms to the percep-
tion of the agent subjected to it. Even though we have less information 
on the conceptualization of the luxury threshold, it seems plausible to 
also include it in the category of objective thresholds, since otherwise 
it might be claimed that examples such as the notorious Beverly Hills 
case (see Benbaji 2005: 314–315) would require some form of redistri-
bution, if at least some of the individuals involved would not consider 
that they are at a luxury level of welfare.
The second distinction between welfare suffi ciency views that is im-
portant for the purposes of this paper, concerns the second question 
raised earlier on in this section, i.e. how the currency is to be distrib-
uted below the threshold of suffi ciency.7 The main positions regarding 
distribution below the threshold are to either commit to the headcount 
claim, which states that “we should maximize the number of people 
who secure enough” (Shields 2012: 103) or to commit to prioritarianism, 
7 While the third and fourth questions raised above are important in their own 
rights, they have no bearing on the arguments in this article.
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which in its canonical formulation states that “benefi ting people mat-
ters more the worse off these people are” (Parfi t 1997: 213). To briefl y 
illustrate the difference between the two views, consider an example 
where we have two individuals with an identical suffi ciency level of 20 
units of welfare, in which the fi rst one has in the current state of the 
world a level of 0 welfare and the second one is at a level of 15 units 
of welfare and in which we have to decide on how to distribute 5 extra 
units of welfare. While the suffi cientarian committed to the headcount 
claim would give these 5 extra units to the second person, since it would 
enable one person to reach the suffi ciency threshold, the suffi cientarian 
committed to prioritarianism under the threshold would give more (or 
even all) units to the fi rst person, since benefi ting her has greater mor-
al weight considering that she is worse-off. Both positions are defended 
by various suffi cientarians, with the headcount claim being endorsed 
by Frankfurt (1987: 31) or Dorsey (2008: 437–438) and prioritarianism 
under the threshold by Crisp (2003: 758), Huseby (2010: 184) or Shields 
(2012: 111).
With these distinctions in mind, we can proceed with analysing the 
plausibility of various suffi ciency views in light of the cases described 
to be in section 4 and 5. However, before advancing to this point it 
is worthwhile to describe the basic elements of a further distinction 
which is central to my cases, namely the distinction between maximiz-
ing views of rationality and satisfi cing views of rationality. I take up 
this task in the next section.
3. Maximization and Slotean satisfi cing
While discussions on the concepts of maximization and satisfi cing have 
occupied a signifi cant place in economics ever since Simon’s sugges-
tion of the latter idea (Simon 1947),8 in political and moral philosophy, 
the distinction between maximizing and satisfi cing types of rational-
ity is usually traced back to Slote’s (1984) restatement of the idea of 
satisfi cing as a permissible operationalization of act-consequentialism. 
The original development of the idea that people might act in a satis-
fi cing rather than maximizing manner was part of the wider project 
undertook by Simon to “replace the global rationality of economic man 
with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to 
information and computational capacities that are actually possessed 
by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which 
such organisms exist” (Simon 1955: 99). Briefl y, we can state that while 
maximization entails the three-step sequence: (1) enumerate all the op-
tions on offer, (2) evaluate each, (3) choose the best option, a satisfi cing 
behaviour follows the sequence: (1) set an aspiration level such that 
any option which reaches or surpasses it is good enough, (2) begin to 
enumerate and evaluate the options on offer, (3) choose the fi rst option 
8 Even though it was not introduced under this specifi c label.
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which, given the aspiration level, is good enough (Pettit 1984: 166–
167). Slote’s conception of satisfi cing departs from Simon’s, however, 
in an essential way. As he argues, “the sort of satisfi cing involved [in 
his own theory] is not (merely) the kind familiar in the economics lit-
erature where an individual seeks something other than optimum re-
sults, but a kind of satisfi cing that actually rejects the available better 
for the available good enough” (Slote 1984: 148). This proposal lies in 
stark contrast to the classical understanding of satisfi cing, where the 
individual appeals to it in order to “reduce the informational and com-
putational requirements of rational choice” (Byron 1998: 71), but given 
two options which differ from the perspective of the utility produced, 
would always choose the better one.9, 10 Phrased in this way, it is not im-
mediately clear whether Slote’s notion of satisfi cing can make sense as 
a rational strategy, since it would explicitly reject a better alternative 
in favour of a worse one. In order to yield some intuitive plausibility to 
the notion, Slote appeals to a number of examples.
In the fi rst such example, you are asked to imagine that you are at 
work and have just fi nished eating lunch. You return to your desk and 
realize that there is a candy bar or a coke in the refrigerator which is 
placed right next to you. While you are no longer hungry or thirsty, you 
are not satiated to the point where consumption of the candy bar or 
coke would not give you additional pleasure. However, you still choose 
not to consume them (Slote 1984: 143–144). In the second example, we 
are asked to think of a fairy-tale hero who is given the opportunity to 
have a single wish granted and does not choose a big pot of gold or a 
million dollars, but just enough to enable him and his family to live a 
comfortable life (Slote 1984: 147). In the third example, we are asked to 
imagine a situation where a family’s car breaks down in the middle of 
the night next to a hotel. The family is quite poor so they cannot afford 
to rent a room or purchase a meal. Given these conditions, the hotel 
manager arranges for them to be accommodated, free of charge, in one 
of the vacant rooms, although not the most expensive one, and receive 
a meal, also free of charge, from the evening’s left-overs, although not 
the best meal available (Slote 1984: 149–150). The strand that ties 
together all these examples is the fact that the agent responsible for 
making a choice had a set of alternatives available before him and de-
9 Slote himself admits that this is the position of Simon, and further states that 
the “idea of rational satisfi cing implies only that individuals or fi rms do not always 
seek to optimize and are satisfi ed with attaining a certain ‘aspiration level’ less than 
the best that might be envisaged. It does not imply that it could be rational actually 
to reject the better for the good enough in situations where both were available” 
(Slote 1984: 145).
10 The reason why I do not take into account classical satisfi cing, but rather 
the Slotean version, is precisely the fact that Simon’s individual would satisfi ce 
due to time or informational constraints and such issues do not usually bear much 
weight in normative theories. Simonian satisfi cing is thus unlikely to provide the 
groundwork for any interesting analysis of suffi cientarianism.
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liberately chose a sub-maximizing one. Slote claims that in each one 
of the cases discussed however, the strategy of choosing less than the 
best can be construed as rational in any common-sense interpretation. 
The primary reason which Slote offers is that individuals might some-
times exhibit a form of moderation which precludes them from taking 
more benefi ts rather than fewer.11 In his own words, “the moderate in-
dividual [...] is someone content with (what he considers) a reasonable 
amount of enjoyment; he wants to be satisfi ed and up to a certain point 
he wants more satisfactions rather than fewer, to be better off rather 
than worse off; but there is a point beyond which he has no desire, and 
even refuses, to go” (Slote 1986: 60).
It is, of course, not clear whether the examples provided by Slote 
couldn’t be otherwise grounded by various rational (in the classical 
sense) reasons, thereby making his claim about the non-maximizing 
character of his proposal collapse. This idea is suggested by Pettit 
(1984), who discusses the examples offered above and, while agree-
ing with Slote that they are instances of satisfi cing behaviour, he adds 
that they can be construed as rational precisely because of other con-
siderations which the agent weighed in her decision-making process. 
Only if no such reasons are brought into the picture, the unmotivated 
sub-maximization which results is in Pettit’s terms irrational. In defer-
ence to the possibility that individuals satisfi ce for the sake of a more 
sophisticated brand of maximization, Slote proposes a distinction be-
tween two types of satisfi cing, namely instrumental satisfi cing on the 
one hand and non-instrumental or intrinsical satisfi cing on the other 
(Slote 2004: 14). The instrumental view of satisfi cing holds that an in-
dividual might deliberately choose an inferior alternative only when 
this course of action would lead to an overall maximization of welfare. 
In various forms (see for instance Schmidtz 2004 or Narveson 2004), 
the plausibility of this general view encounters no major resistance 
amongst political and moral philosophers. The non-instrumental view 
of satisfi cing however, which Slote himself admits has been “decided-
ly the minority view on the rationality involved in satisfi cing” (Slote 
2004: 14), claims that limiting consumption of goods before reaching 
the point where the marginal utility experienced is null has intrinsical 
value. The plausibility of this idea is much more controversial and no 
common ground is reached in this respect.12 Since the cases which I 
build in the following section do not rest on a particular view of Slotean 
satisfi cing I will not provide a defence of the intrinsical conception, but 
rather interpret the idea of Slotean satisfi cing in accordance with the 
instrumental conception. If the intrinsical conception would turn out to 
11 See, however, Schmidtz (2004: 32) for a disentanglement of the ideas of 
moderation and satisfi cing, which Slote often uses interchangeably (Slote 1984: 147, 
Slote 1986: 65, Slote 2004: 16).
12 For a wider view on the debate between critics and defenders of satisfi cing 
views in moral and political philosophy see Byron (2004).
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be plausible, the arguments developed would analogously apply to that 
interpretation as well.
What is important to note, however, is that the notion of Slotean 
satisfi cing is not equivalent to other notions used to build subjective 
thresholds in some suffi cientarian views, such as Frankfurt’s account 
of contentment. As noted in section 2, the idea of contentment proposed 
by Frankfurt does not imply that the individual who reaches her sub-
jectively-set threshold cannot gain any further welfare above this level. 
Instead, since in Frankfurt’s view “the use of the notion of ‘enough’ 
pertains to meeting a standard rather than to reaching a limit” (Frank-
furt 1987: 37, original emphasis), it is entirely plausible to claim that 
given two options, one of which is right at the threshold of contentment 
and the other one somewhat above it, the individual in question would 
choose the latter over the former, due to the higher output of utility, 
even though she would be in one sense satisfi ed with both. But the idea 
of satisfi cing, as used by Slote, has different implications. While ad-
ditional resources would still yield an improvement in those aspects of 
welfare derived from the material consumption of goods, it would not 
lead to an all things considered increase in welfare due to the fact that 
it would cause counterbalancing disutility in other areas associated 
with welfare, such as individual attitudes towards moderation. Oth-
erwise, the idea that someone could choose the available good enough 
over the available better would be conceptually inconsistent. This no-
tion of satisfi cing, which is stronger than Frankfurt’s idea of content-
ment, will be used in the subsequent sections.
4. Resource suffi cientarianism and violations 
of the principle of personal good
Consider the following case:
Resource plenitude. In a society composed of three individuals (Al-
ice, Brian and Charlie), there are 60 resources available for distri-
bution. Each unit of resource consumed yields exactly one unit of 
utility for every individual and none of them are satiated at any 
point. Alice is a satisfi cer, with her aspiration level set at 30 units of 
utility, Brian is a satisfi cer, with his aspiration level set at 10 units 
of utility and Charlie is a maximizer.
Consider now that, irrespective of the procedure used, the resource 
suffi cientarian,13 who claims that what is important from the point 
of view of justice is that enough resources are distributed to each in-
dividual, has established that the suffi ciency threshold is at 20 units 
of resources. Fortunately, from the resource suffi cientarian’s point of 
13 I take Orr’s (2005) view to be the standard version of resource suffi cientarianism. 
While Orr does not provide answers to a number of questions which a complete 
suffi cientarian theory should standardly address, the endorsement of resources as a 
currency of suffi cientarianism is enough for my present purposes.
82 A.Volacu, Maximization, Slotean Satisfi cing
view, there are just enough resources to be distributed so that everyone 
reaches the threshold proposed, thus 20 resources will be distributed to 
each individual. Call this distribution D1 [Alice – 20; Brian – 20; Char-
lie – 20]. This distribution of resources will in turn be converted into 20 
units of utility for Alice, 20 units of utility for Charlie and 10 units of 
utility for Brian, considering that he does not gain any extra benefi ts 
from resources above the amount of 10.14 But consider the alternative 
distributions D2 [Alice – 25, Brian – 10; Charlie – 25] and D3 [Alice 
– 30; Brian – 10; Charlie – 20], which would map into either 25 units 
of utility for Alice and Charlie and 10 for Brian (in D2) or 30 units of 
utility for Alice, 20 units of utility for Charlie and 10 for Brian (in D3). 
Both D2 and D3 yield more aggregate utility than D1 without making 
the situation worse-off for anyone. Still, the resource suffi cientarian is 
bound to claim that D1 is, at least in one way, better than D2 and bet-
ter than D3, since D1 is the only distribution where everyone reaches 
the threshold of suffi ciency. Thus, resource suffi cientarianism violates 
what Broome has called the principle of personal good, which states 
that “if we take two distributions that have the same population, and if 
one of them is better than the other for someone, and at least as good as 
the other for everyone, then it is better”15 (Broome 2004: 58). If we take 
this principle seriously, as many political and moral philosophers do 
(e.g. Broome 1991, Broome 2004, Vallentyne 1993, Tungodden 2003), 
we have a strong reason to object to resource suffi cientarianism. Fur-
thermore, not only is this view clashing with the principle of personal 
good, but it is also committed to benefi t destruction, since it prescribes 
wasting 10 resources, which in an alternative distribution could have 
otherwise benefi ted either Alice or Charlie. In addition, the two prob-
lems raised here are proportionally amplifi ed when: (1) the difference 
between the resource threshold set by the theory and the aspiration 
levels which are below the threshold increases and (2) the number of 
individuals with aspiration levels below the threshold increases.
One possible objection to the idea that resource suffi cientarianism 
might be committed to violations of the principle of personal good and to 
benefi t destruction is that the example proposed is simply implausible, 
since the aspiration level of an individual would not be positioned below 
the resource threshold. In the absence of any particular specifi cation 
of a resource threshold in the suffi cientarian literature, it is diffi cult to 
reply to this objection in a very concrete manner. However, one general 
response is that for resource suffi cientarianism to gain any moral plau-
sibility, the threshold cannot be located at very low levels, since at such 
14 The alternative would be that Brian’s utility actually decreases when further 
receiving resources. I do not take this stronger case into consideration here, since the 
weaker case suffi ces for making the intended point.
15 This can also be interpreted as a strong form of the Pareto Principle. 
Tungodden remarks that while the two are structurally identical, the principle of 
personal good is “stated in the space of individual good or well-being and not in the 
space of individual preferences” (Tungodden 2003: 8).
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levels the negative thesis would no longer appear attractive. Consider 
that such a low threshold would be the level where individuals would 
have only very basic access to food, water, clean air and so forth, so that 
they can survive on a day-to-day basis. It would be, I think, correct to 
claim that no aspiration level can be found lower than this threshold. If 
such a threshold was in place, however, it would also mean that justice 
should not be concerned with the difference in resources between some-
one who has enough to barely survive for another day and a billionaire 
like Bill Gates, a position which intuitively appears to be radically im-
plausible. Defending a multi-level version of resource suffi cientarian-
ism might partially mitigate this problem, in that the lowest threshold 
might be placed at a level below which no aspiration level would reason-
ably be located. But introducing a higher threshold, which is required 
in order to retain the attractiveness of the negative thesis, opens up the 
real possibility that the aspiration level of some individuals falls un-
der this threshold, for reasons which have to do with attitudes towards 
moderation, religious attitudes etc. If we take case-implication critiques 
(Sen 1979: 197) seriously, then this possibility grounds a plausible ob-
jection against resource suffi cientarianism.
5. Welfare suffi cientarianism and violations 
of the principle of equal importance
Now consider a second case:
Resource scarcity. In a society composed of three individuals (Alice, 
Brian and Charlie), there are 40 resources available for distribu-
tion. Each unit of resource consumed yields exactly one unit of util-
ity for every individual and none of them are satiated at any point. 
Alice is a satisfi cer, with her aspiration level set at 30 units of util-
ity, Brian is a satisfi cer, with his aspiration level set at 10 units of 
utility and Charlie is a maximizer.
Let us fi rst consider the response which a subjective-threshold welfare 
suffi cientarian, such as Frankfurt, would give to this case. Since Alice 
and Brian have aspiration levels set at 30 and 10, respectively, con-
sider these levels as their subjective thresholds.16 Further, according to 
Frankfurt, what is important from the point of view of justice in cases 
of resource shortages is that the incidence of suffi ciency is maximized. 
The two positions converge to yield a precise distribution in this case, 
which is: D4 [Alice – 30; Brian – 10; Charlie – 0]. This distribution is 
the only one which maximizes the incidence of suffi ciency, understood 
in a subjective sense, since it is the only one in which two of the three 
individuals have reached the threshold. Since Charlie has no threshold 
of contentment, he will receive no resources. Furthermore, if a wind-
fall should occur, yielding 20 more resources for distribution (thereby 
16 Noting that they are not only levels of contentment, in Frankfurt’s sense, but 
the stronger types of aspiration levels implied by Slote’s conception of satisfi cing.
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transforming this case into Resource plenitude), a subjective-threshold 
welfare suffi cientarian is bound to say that we should be indifferent be-
tween giving any amount of resources to Alice, Brian or Charlie, even 
though Charlie is in a position where he has no resources at all.17
Secondly, consider the response which a specifi c type of objective-
threshold welfare suffi cientarian, namely one who is committed to the 
headcount claim would provide to the case at hand. Since the example 
is one of resource scarcity, we will assume that not all individuals can 
be raised to the threshold with the resources available. Consider there-
fore that the objective welfare threshold is set at 20. The type of suf-
fi cientarianism in which we are interested here would then prescribe 
distribution D5 [Alice – 20; Brian – 0; Charlie – 20]. The reason why 
this is the case is that D5 is the only distribution in which two of the 
three individuals reach the objectively established threshold. Further-
more, if a windfall should occur, yielding 20 more resources for distri-
bution (once again, transforming this case into Resource plenitude), the 
objective-threshold welfare suffi cientarian committed to the headcount 
claim would state that we should be indifferent between providing any 
amount of resources for Alice, Brian or Charlie, since any amount of 
resources which we provide Brian with will not be enough for him to 
reach the welfare threshold, although he is in a position where he has 
no resources at all.18
17 As one anonymous reviewer has pointed out, it might be objected that subjective-
threshold welfare suffi cientarianism would not necessarily entail a distribution of 0 
resources for Charlie—due to the fact that he is a maximizer—but that we could 
instead impute an average satisfi cing level and set that as a distributive threshold 
for him. This objection is unsuccessful, however, in cases involving suffi cientarian 
views of this type, precisely because the subjectivist manner of deriving distributive 
thresholds precludes attaching externally built features to it. As subjective 
thresholds appeal only to the preferences of the individual in question, imputing the 
average satisfi cing level (or any other form of externally produced level) amounts 
to a collapse into objective-threshold welfare suffi cientarianism, a separate view 
from that which was scrutinized in this paragraph (and which will be subsequently 
examined).
18 It may be worth questioning if the unappealing prescriptions offered by 
subjective-threshold suffi cientarianism might not draw their force simply from the 
fact that Frankfurt’s version (which I used as a standard operationalization of this 
type of suffi ciency view) is itself committed to the headcount claim as well. If this is 
correct, than Frankfurt’s own suffi cientarian position might seem less plausible in 
light of the example, but other subjective-threshold suffi cientarian views might be 
unaffected. My reply to this argument is that even if the headcount claim is dropped 
from subjective-threshold suffi cientarianism, the view simply cannot accommodate 
individuals who do not have contentment levels regarding the distribution of 
resources (this is perhaps most vivid in the case which Frankfurt himself discusses, 
that of monetary resources). If a person does not have a contentment level (at least 
in the weaker sense proposed by Frankfurt), then prioritarian or other types of 
arrangements for distributions under the threshold simply cannot count her in the 
distribution, at least while there are still other individuals that might reach their 
thresholds. The subjective-threshold view is therefore committed at a much deeper 
level than any other suffi cientarian view examined here to make homogeneous 
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What do these two responses, derived from different normative 
principles, have in common? In both cases, one person appears to be 
signifi cantly disadvantaged by the distribution, since she is up to a 
point entitled to no resources whatsoever and only after a certain 
point (where all others have reached the suffi ciency thresholds) she 
has claims which are on par with the other subjects of the distribu-
tion, but not more pressing, even when she is at a miserable level of 
welfare and the others are at a blissful level. This result appears to be 
deeply at odds with some basic moral claims. To illustrate this, con-
sider for instance Dworkin’s principle of equal importance, according to 
which government should “adopt laws and policies that insure that its 
citizens fate are [...] insensitive to who they otherwise are—their eco-
nomic backgrounds, gender, race, or particular sets of skills and handi-
caps” (Dworkin 2000: 6). I take this ethical principle to be relatively 
uncontroversial, since it expresses a more generic impartiality condi-
tion which has been a staple of the literature on distributive justice 
within the past decades19. If we take the principle of equal importance 
seriously, then the distributions prescribed by both welfarist subjec-
tive-threshold suffi cientarians and objective-threshold suffi cientarians 
committed to the headcount claim appear to be problematic as they 
assign unequal importance to individuals based on an internal char-
acteristic, namely the type of rationality that they hold, which is mor-
ally arbitrary.20 The unequal treatment of maximizing individuals in 
subjective-threshold welfare suffi cientarianism and the unequal treat-
ment of satisfi cing individuals who cannot reach the aspiration levels 
set in objective-threshold welfare suffi cientarianism committed to the 
headcount claim, therefore count as serious objections against them.
assumptions regarding the rationality of individuals, since the existence of 
maximizers not only renders this view morally implausible but it raises a challenge 
to the coherence of the view as a whole.
19 See however the critical position adopted by Steinhoff (2014) against the 
ideas of equal concern and respect, which implicitly encompasses a criticism of the 
Dworkinian principle of equal importance.
20 I do not mean to suggest that some forms of satisfi cing would not perhaps 
be desirable in some cases. But I maintain that there are at least two arguments 
in defence of the claim that satisfi cient individuals warrant no special priority in 
the distribution of resources. The fi rst one concerns the possibility that satisfi cers 
are in fact not always moderate, since moderation is not necessarily connected to 
satisfi cing (as Schmidtz 2004 shows). If the aspiration level of an individual would be 
so high that reaching it would require a drainage of resources which could otherwise 
be distributed to maximizers in order that they reach a decent level of welfare, 
than it seems clear that we should not give any sort of priority to the satisfi cing 
individual. Further, if we consider satisfi cing and maximization as actual behavioral 
features (and not simply useful assumptions for theory-building), it is questionable 
to what extent they are traceable to individual choices and it would seem more likely 
that they are not. Therefore, it would be highly controversial to punish or reward 
individuals for being endowed with a trait for the formation of which they can claim 
no responsibility.
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6. A resilient competitor: Crisp’s suffi cientarian view
Let us now examine how a distinct version of suffi cientarianism, i.e. 
one which proposes an objective welfare threshold but is at the same 
time not committed to the headcount claim, would respond to cases 
such as Resource plenitude and Resource scarcity. Since Crisp’s (2003) 
formulation of the suffi ciency view meets both demands,21 I will take 
his version as the standard-bearer for this type of suffi cientarianism. 
What would such a view entail in the case of Resource plenitude? As-
sume, again, that the objective threshold is set at 20. First, since the 
view endorses prioritarianism below the threshold, all other things be-
ing equal, it would sequentially raise each individual with one unit 
of welfare until all of them reach the level 10. Up to this point, 30 
resources have been distributed, so 30 units remain. Since Brian no 
longer gains any further utility after having 10 resources, the next 20 
units would be distributed sequentially to Alice and Charlie, until both 
of them reach the suffi ciency threshold. Finally, the remaining 10 re-
sources are distributed between Alice and Charlie, since no further dis-
tribution towards Brian would manage to raise him over the threshold. 
If we follow Crisp’s (2003: 758) suggestion that utilitarianism would 
be a plausible pattern for distribution over the threshold, all possible 
distributions of the last 10 resources to Alice and Charlie are equally 
preferable. The distribution prescribed by Crisp’s suffi cientarian view 
would therefore be either D2 [Alice – 25, Brian – 10; Charlie – 25], 
D3 [Alice – 30; Brian – 10; Charlie – 20] or some other version which 
distributes between 20 and 30 resources for Alice and Charlie and 10 
resources for Brian. Thus, Crisp’s view avoids violating the principle of 
personal good, since it considers that both D2 and D3 are preferable to 
D1, and at the same avoids destroying benefi ts, since it does not give 
more resources to Brian than he can convert into welfare.
Let us now see how Crisp’s suffi cientarianism fares in the Resource 
scarcity case. It once again begins by sequentially distributing one re-
source to each of the three individuals until all of them reach a level 
of 10 welfare. Since Brian no longer derives any utility from receiving 
more resources, the fi nal 10 resources to be distributed are then equal-
ly allocated to Alice and Charlie, resulting in D6 [Alice – 15; Brian – 
10; Charlie – 15]. This is because the threshold is set too high for all 
individuals to reach it and below the threshold, inequalities are to be 
arranged in a prioritarian manner. Thus, since we attach more weight 
to the distributive claims of individuals the lower their welfare levels 
are, we cannot proceed with distributing one more unit to an individual 
who is better-off, while there is still one individual who is worse-off and 
could be made better-off. This grounds both our reasons to distribute 
an equal amount of resources to all individuals until they reach level 10 
21 As it prescribes an objective threshold at the level where an impartial spectator 
would no longer feel compassion for the individual in question and it prescribes a 
prioritarian distribution below the threshold.
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and our reasons not to distribute any more resources to Brian after this 
level, since he can no longer be made better-off. A theory which claims 
that D6 should be enacted instead of either D4 [Alice – 30; Brian – 10; 
Charlie – 0] or D5 [Alice – 20; Brian – 0; Charlie – 20] in the case of 
Resource scarcity has great intuitive appeal since it avoids violating the 
principle of equal importance. It does not punish or otherwise mistreat 
either Charlie (who in D4 would have received nothing) for being a 
maximizer, or Brian (who in D5 would have received nothing) for being 
a satisfi cer. Taking this into consideration, an objective-threshold wel-
fare suffi cientarian theory which is committed to prioritarianism below 
the threshold (of which Crisp’s view would be a classical example), is in 
a position to provide a better reply to cases such as Resource plenitude 
and Resource scarcity than resource suffi cientarianism, subjective-
threshold welfare suffi cientarianism or objective-threshold welfare suf-
fi cientarianism committed to the headcount claim are able to do.
7. Conclusions
The suffi ciency view has drawn a considerable amount of attention in 
the literature on distributive justice in the past two decades, albeit 
much less than fi rmly established rivals such as the egalitarian and, 
more recently, prioritarian views. In this paper, I sought to open a new 
line of criticism as well as comparison between suffi ciency views, which 
has been until this point unexplored, namely what sort of responses will 
suffi cientarian theories offer to cases where individuals act on the basis 
of different conceptions of rationality. In order to construct a plausible 
view of the way in which individuals might be differentially rational, 
I appealed to the classical notion of a maximizing behavior on the one 
hand and the notion of Slotean satisfi cing on the other. I then assessed 
the responses provided by four different types of suffi ciency views in 
cases based on these different accounts of rationality. The conclusions 
drawn in this article support objective-threshold welfare suffi cientari-
anism committed to a prioritarian distribution under the threshold, 
the classical version of such a theory being that of Crisp, which I claim 
responds correctly to both cases presented. By contrast, I argue that 
resource suffi cientarianism offers the wrong response to cases such 
as Resource plenitude, since it violates the principle of personal good, 
while allowing for benefi ts to be wasted rather than distributed, and 
both subjective-threshold welfare suffi cientarianism and objective-
threshold welfare suffi cientarianism committed to the headcount claim 
offer the wrong response to cases such as Resource scarcity, since they 
violate, in opposite fashions, the principle of equal importance. It is, of 
course, possible to either object to these conclusions, by claiming that 
the principle of personal good or the principle of equal importance are 
simply not morally salient, or that there may be other implications 
of objective-threshold welfare suffi cientarianism committed to pri-
oritarianism below the threshold that might prove, on balance, more 
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problematic.22 It is also possible to reduce the force of my objections 
by accommodating them within the framework of the criticized views 
through an appeal to value pluralism, in order to avoid violations of 
the above mentioned principles. Regardless, the article still provides a 
strong reason23 in favour of Crisp’s (and similarly constructed) version 
of suffi cientarianism against other types of suffi ciency views, e.g. those 
of Frankfurt and Orr, as they presently stand.
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